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Abstract
We consider the communication scenario where a source-destination pair wishes to keep the in-
formation secret from a relay node despite wanting to enlist its help. For this scenario, an interesting
question is whether the relay node should be deployed at all. That is, whether cooperation with an
untrusted relay node can ever be beneficial. We first provide an achievable secrecy rate for the general
untrusted relay channel, and proceed to investigate this question for two types of relay networks with
orthogonal components. For the first model, there is an orthogonal link from the source to the relay.
For the second model, there is an orthogonal link from the relay to the destination. For the first model,
we find the equivocation capacity region and show that answer is negative. In contrast, for the second
model, we find that the answer is positive. Specifically, we show by means of the achievable secrecy
rate based on compress-and-forward, that, by asking the untrusted relay node to relay information, we
can achieve a higher secrecy rate than just treating the relay as an eavesdropper. For a special class of
the second model, where the relay is not interfering itself, we derive an upper bound for the secrecy
rate using an argument whose net effect is to separate the eavesdropper from the relay. The merit of
the new upper bound is demonstrated on two channels that belong to this special class. The Gaussian
case of the second model mentioned above benefits from this approach in that the new upper bound
improves the previously known bounds. For the Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel, the new upper
bound finds the secrecy capacity when the source-destination link is not worse than the source-relay
link, by matching with achievable rate we present.
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ISIT 2008, July, 2008. This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation with Grants CCR-0237727, CCF-
051483, CNS-0716325, and the DARPA ITMANET Program with Grant W911NF-07-1-0028.
2I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental approach to information security is founded in information theory where the
limits of reliable communication can be determined while keeping the information secret from
eavesdropping node(s). This notion of secrecy was first proposed by Shannon [1]. In his work,
Shannon assumed that the eavesdropper has perfect access to the signal transmitted from the
source to the destination and determined that the rate of key must equal to the rate of data to
ensure “perfect secrecy”, i.e., in order for the data not to be leaked to the eavesdropper even if
the eavesdropper has unlimited computational power. Wyner, in [2], pointed out that Shannon’s
assumption is pessimistic, as more often than not, the eavesdropper only has a noisy copy of
the signal transmitted from the source and building a useful secure communication system per
Shannon’s notion is possible [2], [3].
Recent work in this area aims to find the secrecy capacity or capacity region for a variety of
communication scenarios and channel models. A set of models follows the classical model of
Wyner’s wiretap channel [2], where an external eavesdropper is present in addition to legitimate
parties. This line of work includes the multiple input multiple output (MIMO) wiretap channel
[4]–[6], the wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer [7], the multiple access wiretap channel
[8]–[11], the MIMO broadcast channel with multiple legitimate receivers and an external eaves-
dropper [12], the two-way wiretap channel [10], the relay channel with an external eavesdropper
[13]. In these models, where the information leaked to the eavesdropper is a loss to the legitimate
communication system, it was observed that legitimate parties could aid in enhancing secrecy
by introducing intentional interference to the eavesdropper via cooperative jamming [7], [10],
[14]. Another set of models deals with a more symmetric scenario, where each receiver of an
intended message is also modeled as an eavesdropper for the remaining unintended messages in
the system. This setting has been considered for the multiple access [15], broadcast [16], [17],
and interference channels [18], [19]. In these models, one communication pair, in the interest of
protecting its own information, may end up helping the other pair [19].
The focus of this work, while on cooperative communications, differs from the above models
in that, it deals with a communication network whose nodes have different levels of security
clearance. Examples like this exist in real life. In a government intelligence network or the
network of a financial institution, not every node in the network is supposed to have the same
3level of access to information, despite operating with agreed protocols and serving as relay
nodes in the network. The question is whether these untrusted nodes should still participate in
this cooperative communication network, or if they pose a “problem” when secret messages are
to be transmitted, and hence, their cooperation should not be enlisted. The basic issue addressed
here therefore, different from the previous models that aim to solve the co-existence problem of
several communication pairs, is to resolve the conflict within one system.
This paper focuses on the most basic model in this category in order to assess the effect
of secrecy requirements upon cooperative communications. We consider the three node relay
network, where the relay has a lower security clearance than the destination and is therefore
untrusted. Reference [20], the first work that studied this model, shows that the secrecy capacity
of this system is zero if the relay channel is degraded. The secrecy capacity equals that of the
wiretap channel if the channel is reversely degraded, which means that the relay-to-destination
communication is useless in this case as well [21]. In Section IV of this paper, we present
yet another negative result: the relay node is again useless in a class of relay networks with
orthogonal components [22], dubbed Model 1 in the sequel. In each of these references, the
model turns out to be equivalent to the models of the first two categories, where the relay node
is merely an eavesdropper, rather than a cooperating partner.
In light of these results, one might be tempted to take a pessimistic view, and wonder whether
there exists any situation where the cooperation of the untrusted relay might enable a higher
secrecy rate than simply treating it as an eavesdropper. Interestingly, we find in this paper that
the answer to this question is yes. This is shown for a class of relay networks with orthogonal
components where the relay to destination link is orthogonal to that from the source [23], dubbed
Model 2 in the sequel. Specifically, we observe that by performing compress-and-forward, the
relay node can help increase an otherwise zero secrecy rate without having any idea what it is
relaying.
Once an achievable secrecy rate with the untrusted relay being useful is found, an upper bound
on the secrecy rate is needed to assess how close the achievable strategy is to the optimum. There
are two previously known upper bounds. Reference [13] provided an upper bound for the relay
channel with an external eavesdropper. By assuming that this external eavesdropper receives the
signals received and transmitted by the relay, we observe the model in [13] can be specialized
into the model considered in this work and hence the bound in [13] can be readily applied. Alas,
4this bound is not computable for the Gaussian case. A computable bound was provided for the
Gaussian relay channel with a co-located eavesdropper in [21]. Alas, this bound does not depend
on the condition of the relay-to-destination channel. Moreover, the noise correlation of the links
may render the bound to be arbitrarily loose. In this work, we aim to derive an upper bound
that improves the bound in [21] in these two aspects, and accomplish this goal for a class of
untrusted relay channels.
More specifically, the upper bound on the secrecy rate is derived for a special class of Model 2,
where the relay is not interfering itself. The derivation of the upper bound entails the introduction
of a second eavesdropper. Although in general, introducing a second eavesdropper can decrease
the secrecy capacity, we prove that for the special class of channels question, doing so does not
alter the secrecy capacity. The upper bound is then derived by removing the first eavesdropper
at the relay and introducing correlation between the output seen by the second eavesdropper and
other outputs of the channel, which tightens the upper bound as in other Sato-type bounds; see
[5] for example.
The merit of the new upper bound is demonstrated in two cases: First, for the Gaussian case
of Model 2, we show that the new bound improves the previously known bounds. Second, for
the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel introduced in [24], we show that the upper
bound matches the achievable rate using compress-and-forward when the signal to noise ratio
of the source-destination link is not worse than that of the source-relay link, thus, establishing
the secrecy capacity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the general relay
network with a co-located eavesdropper, and an achievable equivocation region for this channel
using the compress-and-forward relaying. In section III, the two special cases of the general
model, i.e., Model 1 and Model 2 are described. Section IV presents the equivocation capacity
region for Model 1. Section V specializes the achievable region found in Section II to Model 2.
Section VI identifies a special class of Model 2, for which introducing a second eavesdropper
properly will not decrease the secrecy capacity, and derives an upper bound for its secrecy rate.
The upper bound is then specialized to the Gaussian case of Model 2. Section VII investigates the
secrecy capacity of Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel. We note that to facilitate a
better flow throughout the manuscript, more involved proofs are presented in appendices whereas
shorter ones are kept in the main text.
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Fig. 1. Relay Channel with a Co-located Eavesdropper: S: Source Node, R/E: Relay Node with a Co-located Eavesdropper,
D: Destination Node.
Throughout this paper, the following notation is used: ∀k, εk denotes a variable that goes to 0
when n goes to ∞. C(x) = 1
2
log2(1+x). X
n denotes a vector of length n, whereas Xi denotes
the ith element of the vector. X]i[ denotes the set {Xj , 1 ≤ j < i or i < j ≤ n}. X i1 denotes the
set {Xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ i}; the set is empty if i < 1. ⌊a⌋ denotes the largest integer less than or equal
to a. The short hand W (a, ..., b) stands for the set {W (a),W (a+1), ...,W (b)}. The short hand
W a stands for the set {W (1),W (2), ...,W (a)}.
II. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE FOR THE GENERAL RELAY CHANNEL WITH CO-LOCATED
EAVESDROPPER
The relay channel with a co-located eavesdropper was first considered in [20] and is shown in
Figure 1. It is a memoryless three-node relay channel [25], whose description is p(Y, Yr|X,Xr).
X,Xr are the channel inputs from the source and the relay respectively, and Y, Yr are the
channel outputs observed by the destination and the relay respectively. We assume that there is
an eavesdropper at the relay node who has access to everything that the relay node knows. The
source wishes to send message W to the destination over n channel uses, while keeping it secret
from the eavesdropper.
Without loss of generality, the relaying function for the ith channel use can be defined as
Xr,i = gi
(
X i−1r , Y
i−1
r , A
)
(1)
where A is a random variable which models any stochastic mapping employed by the relay
node. Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict gi to be a deterministic function.
The information available to the eavesdropper regarding the secret message W is {Xnr , Y nr , A}.
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Fig. 2. Example: Relay’s transmitted signal Xnr can provide more information about W
Thus, the equivocation rate is computed as
Re = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W |Xnr , Y nr , A) (2)
Note that since W−{Xnr , Y nr }−A is a Markov chain, we have H (W |Xnr Y nr A) = H (W |Xnr Y nr ).
Hence the equivocation rate can be instead defined as
Re = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W |Xnr , Y nr ) (3)
.
Remark 1: In general H(W |Y nr ) > H(W |Xnr , Y nr ). To see an example, consider the channel
model in Figure 2. Let ⊕ denote the binary addition. The channel has binary input. The
destination receives signals from two orthogonal links: YR and YD, and that we have
YD = X (4)
YR = Xr ⊕ Z (5)
where Z represents the i.i.d. binary noise.
It follows in this setting that, H(W |Xnr , Y nr ) = 0. This is because the relay can always
subtract the interference caused by Xnr on its received signal and hence obtains Xn. However,
H(W |Y nr ) = H(W ) if Xnr is chosen to be an i.i.d. binary sequences, each component of
which takes the value 1 with probability 1
2
. Thus, in this case, we clearly have H(W |Y nr ) >
H(W |Xnr Y nr ).
We should note however that, H(W |Y nr ) = H(W |Xnr , Y nr ) if the relaying scheme is determin-
istic: Xr,i = gi(X i−1r , Y i−1r ). Also, note that, clearly, any outer bound derived for the equivocation
H(W |Y nr ) is an outer bound for H(W |Xnr , Y nr ).
7With this preparation, the equivocation rate region can be defined as follows: Let the message
decoded by the destination be Wˆ . The equivocation rate region is composed of all rate pairs
(R1, Re) such that:
R1 = lim
n→∞
1
n
log2 |W |
Re = lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W |Xnr , Y nr )
s.t. lim
n→∞
1
n
Pr
(
W 6= Wˆ
)
= 0
Here |W | is the cardinality of the message set W . Note that when block Markov coding
scheme [25] is used, the message is transmitted via successive blocks. In this case, W denotes
the messages transmitted over all blocks. n should be the total number of channel uses of these
blocks. The definition of Xnr , Y nr should be adjusted accordingly.
Next, we derive an achievable equivocation region based on compress-and-forward. Compress-
and-forward scheme was proposed in [25] and has been used for the relay network with an
external eavesdropper in [13], [26]. In our case, as we will see, the fact that the relay and
the eavesdropper being co-located brings additional advantage to allow for a higher degree of
compression to be achieved at the relay as compared to the setting in [13].
Theorem 1: For a relay network described as p(Y, Yr|X,Xr), with X , Xr being the input
from the source and the relay respectively, and Yr,Y being the signals received by the relay and
the destination respectively, the following region of rate pairs (R1, Re) is achievable.
⋃

Re ≤ R1 < I
(
X ; Y Yˆr|Xr
)
0 ≤ Re < [I
(
X ; Y Yˆr|Xr
)
− I (X ; Yr|Xr)]+

 (6)
where
I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Y Xr) (7)
and the union is taken over:
p(X)p(Xr)p(Y, Yr|X,Xr)p(Yˆr|Yr, Xr) (8)
Proof: See Appendix A.
8Remark 2: Compared with the coding scheme presented in [13], the difference is that we
have Wyner-Ziv coding. Without Wyner-Ziv coding, the constraint (7) in the Theorem would be
I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Xr) (9)
which is identical to that in [13, Theorem 4 (12)]. In [13], the eavesdropper is external to the
relay node, and hence only has a noisy copy of Xnr (k). In this case, the equivocation over
multiple blocks would not necessarily be the sum of equivocation over each block. Reference
[13] worked around this problem by using a compress-and-forward scheme without Wyner-Ziv
coding. The equivocation over multiple blocks was then lower bounded by proving that given
the signal received by the eavesdropper and the secret message, the external eavesdropper would
be able to determine the signals transmitted by the source and the relay via backward decoding
[13, Appendix D (53)-(55)].
In contrast to that in [13], fortunately, in our model, the eavesdropper has perfect knowledge
of Xnr (k). This enables us to compute the equivocation of N blocks from the equivocation of
each block. See (137)-(139) in Appendix A. Hence, the Wyner-Ziv coding is used in our setting
without difficulty.
Remark 3: Theorem 1 will be useful in Section V in finding an achievable rate for one of
the models (Model 2) that we will describe in the next section.
Remark 4: We can prefix the channel input X with U and apply Theorem 1 to the channel
p(Y, Yr|U,Xr). The equivocation region then becomes:
⋃

Re ≤ R1 < I
(
U ; Y Yˆr|Xr
)
0 ≤ Re < [I
(
U ; Y Yˆr|Xr
)
− I (U ; Yr|Xr)]+

 (10)
for which (7) must be fulfilled, and the union is taken over:
p(U,X)p(Xr)p(Y, Yr|X,Xr)p(Yˆr|Yr, Xr) (11)
Clearly, this may potentially enlarge the achievable region given by Theorem 1.
Having examined the general relay channel with a co-located eavesdropper, we next consider
two special cases of it for which stronger results can be derived.
9Xr
S
XR
XD
Y D
R/EYr
Fig. 3. Relay Channel with Orthogonal Components Model 1: Orthogonal Source to Relay Link
III. TWO SPECIAL CASES OF THE GENERAL MODEL: RELAY NETWORKS WITH
ORTHOGONAL COMPONENTS
The two models of the relay network with orthogonal components are depicted in Figures 3
and 4 respectively. Figure 3 shows Model 1. In this model, the relay and the source communicate
with the destination via a multiple access channel, with its input being XD, Xr and output being
Y . The source and the relay communicate via a channel orthogonal to the channel used by the
source and the relay to transmit to the destination. The input and the output of this channel are
denoted by XR and Yr respectively. Thus, the overall channel description is:
p (Y, Yr|XR, XD, Xr) = p (Y |XD, Xr) p (Yr|XR, Xr) (12)
The capacity of this network without secrecy constraints was found in [22].
The Gaussian case of Model 1 is defined as [22]:
Yr = aXR + Z1, Y = bXr +XD + Z (13)
where Z1 and Z are independent zero mean real Gaussian random variables each with variance
N . a and b are channel gains. The transmit power constraints on the source and the relay are
given by:
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
E[X2R,i] + E[X
2
D,i]
)
≤ P, 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2r,i] ≤ γP (14)
Figure 4 shows Model 2. In Model 2, the source communicates with the relay and the
destination via a broadcast channel, and the relay communicates with the destination via a
separate (orthogonal) link. Thus, the channel is described by:
p (YD, YR, Yr|X,Xr) = p(YD|X)p(Yr|X,Xr, YD)p (YR|Xr) (15)
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Fig. 4. Relay Channel with Orthogonal Components Model 2: Orthogonal Relay to Destination Link
When there are no secrecy constraints, the Gaussian case of Model 2 was considered in [23].
The capacity of this channel remains an open problem except for some special cases given in
[23].
The class of channels for which we will be able to derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate,
is described by:
p(YD, YR, Yr|X,Xr) = p(YD|X)p(Yr|X, YD)p(YR|Xr) (16)
Observe that such a channel is a special case of (15) since Xr is dropped from the condition
term of Yr in (15).
We will discuss two channels that fall into the class defined by (16): (i) the Gaussian case of
Model 2, (ii) the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel [24].
The Gaussian case of Model 2 is defined as:
YD = X + ZD Yr = aX + Zr
YR = bXr + ZR
(17)
where ZD, Zr, ZR are independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance. a
and b are channel gains. The transmit power of the source and the relay are constrained by:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2r,i] ≤ Pr,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2i ] ≤ P (18)
The Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel is depicted in Figure 5. The received
signals at the destination and at the relay are given by:
YD = X + Z, Yr = αX − Z (19)
where α is the channel gain and Z is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance.
Notice that the random variables representing the noise components have a correlation ρ = −1.
11
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Fig. 5. The Gaussian Cover-Kim Deterministic Relay channel
Between the relay and the destination, there is a separate noiseless link with rate R0. The
destination receives side information from the relay via this link in addition to YD which it
receives from the source. The transmission power of the source is constrained to be:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X2i ] ≤ P (20)
In the following sections, we first derive the equivocation capacity region of Model 1. We
then derive the achievable equivocation region for Model 2 using the results from Section II.
Finally, we derive the upper bound for the secrecy rate for the class of Model 2 defined in (16)
and specialize it to the Gaussian case and the Cover-Kim channel.
IV. EQUIVOCATION CAPACITY REGION FOR MODEL 1
Theorem 2: The equivocation capacity region of Model 1 is given by
⋃
p(Xr)
p(XD |Xr)
p(XR|Xr)


(R1, Re) :
0 ≤ R1 < min
{
I (XD, Xr; Y ) , I (XR; Yr|Xr) + I (XD; Y |Xr)
}
0 ≤ Re < min{I (XD; Y |Xr) , R1}


(21)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 5: Theorem 2 is proved by specializing the results from [21]. The achievable scheme
is based on partial-decode-and-forward. This entails that the relay decodes the information
transmitted via XR. The scheme is outlined next for the sake of completeness:
12
Denote the codebook used by the relay and the source as Cr and {CR, CD} respectively. The
codeword in Cr is denoted by Xnr . The codeword in {CR, CD} is denoted by {XnD, XnR}, which
are to be transmitted via XD and XR respectively.
The codebooks are generated as follows: 2nmin{I(Xr ;Y ),I(XR;Yr|Xr)} codewords are sampled in an
i.i.d. fashion from p(Xr) to form Cr. For each Xnr in Cr, 2nI(XD ;Y |Xr) codewords are sampled in an
i.i.d. fashion from p(XD|Xr) and are included in CD. For each Xnr in Cr, 2nmin{I(Xr ;Y ),I(XR;Yr|Xr)}
codewords are sampled in an i.i.d. fashion from p(XR|Xr) and are included in CR.
The transmission is divided into N blocks, each composed of n channel uses. The messages
transmitted by the source during the kth block is denoted by {WD(k),WR(k)}. WD(k) corre-
sponds to the secret part of the message. The cardinality of {WD(k)} is smaller than 2nI(XD;Y |Xr).
The cardinality of {WR(k)} is smaller than 2nmin{I(Xr ;Y ),I(XR;Yr|Xr)}. The signals received and
transmitted by the relay during the kth block are denoted by Y nr (k) and Xnr (k) respectively.
The relay decodes WR(k) from Y nr (k) using Xnr (k) as the side information. Xnr (k) is chosen
by the relay based on WR(k − 1), which the relay decodes from Y nr (k − 1). The source node
knows WR(k−1), and hence knows Xnr (k) before the kth block starts. It locates the part of the
codebook CR which is generated according to Xnr (k) and transmits the message WR(k) using this
part of the codebook. The source also locates the part of the codebook CD which is generated
according to Xnr (k) and transmits the message WD(k) using this part of the codebook. The
destination can successfully decode WR(k − 1) from Y n(k), which determines Xnr (k), due to
the fact that the cardinality of {WR(k)} is smaller than 2nI(Xr ;Y ). Then it locates the part of the
codebook in CD that is generated according to Xnr (k) and use it to decode WD(k) from Y n(k).
This is possible due to the fact that the cardinality of {WD(k)} is smaller than 2nI(XD;Y |Xr).
Remark 6: By letting Re = R1 in (21), we obtain the secrecy capacity of the network given
by (22).
S = max
p(Xr)p(XD|Xr)
I (Y ;XD|Xr) (22)
= max
p(XD|Xr=xr)
I (Y ;XD|Xr = xr) (23)
It is readily seen that in this case the relay to destination link is not useful. Additionally, when
Re < R1, from the coding scheme outlined in Remark 5, the secret information, WD(k), is
only mapped to signal transmitted via XD, which means the secret information does not pass
through the relay node at all. These two observations combined lead to the conclusion that the
13
relay-to-destination link is indeed not useful in improving the secrecy rate of the system, and
that the untrusted relay should not be deployed at all.
A direct extension of the above result can be readily made to the Gaussian channel. 1
Corollary 1: For the Gaussian relay network described above, the equivocation region is given
by (24).
⋃
0≤v,ρ≤1


R1 < min
{
C
(
(v+b2γ+2bρ
√
vγ)P
N
)
, C
(
a2(1−v)P
N
)
+ C
(
v(1−ρ2)P
N
) }
0 ≤ Re < C
(
v(1−ρ2)P
N
)
Re ≤ R1

 (24)
Proof: The proof is the same as in reference [22, Section III]. The three terms: I(XD, Xr; Y ),
I(XR; Yr|Xr), I(XD; Y |Xr) are maximized simultaneously when Xr, XD, XR are chosen to be
zero mean and jointly Gaussian with the following parameters: V ar[Xr] = γP, V ar[XR] =
(1− v)P, V ar[XD] = vP, E[XrXD] = ρP√vγ, E[XRXD] = 0.
V. AN ACHIEVABLE REGION FOR MODEL 2
In this section, we present the achievable equivocation rate region for Model 2.
Theorem 3: For Model 2 defined by (15), an achievable equivocation rate region is given by:
⋃

Re ≤ R1 < I
(
X ; YDYˆr|XrYR
)
0 ≤ Re < [I
(
X ; YDYˆr|XrYR
)
− I (X ; Yr|Xr)]+

 (25)
where
I(Xr; YR) > I(Yˆr; Yr|YDYRXr) (26)
and the union is taken over:
p(X)p(Xr)p(YD|X)p(Yr|X,Xr, YD)p(YR|Xr)p(Yˆr|Yr, Xr) (27)
Proof: We use Theorem 1. In particular, region (25) follows from (6) by letting Y =
{YD, YR} and using the following two Markov chains (28) and (29). (29) follows from the fact
that {Xr, YR} is independent from YD as shown by (27).
X −Xr − YR (28)
1Proofs follow by replacing entropy with differential entropy whenever necessary.
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Xr − YR − YD (29)
It then follows from (28) and (29) that I(Xr; YRYD) = I(Xr; YR) and
I(X ; YRYDYˆr|Xr) = I(X ; YDYˆr|XrYR) (30)
Next, we apply Theorem 3 to the Gaussian case, which is defined by (17).
Corollary 2: For the Gaussian relay network with orthogonal components defined by (17),
the following rate region is achievable.
⋃
0≤p≤P


(Re, R1) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1 < C
(
p+ a
2p
1+σ2
Q
)
Re < C
(
p+ a
2p
1+σ2
Q
)
− C (a2p)

 (31)
where
σ2Q =
(a2 + 1) p+ 1
b2Pr (p+ 1)
(32)
Proof: Region (31) follows from letting X ∼ N (0, p), Xr ∼ N (0, Pr), Yˆr = Yr+ZQ, ZQ ∼
N (0, σ2Q), and ZQ is independent from all the other variables. Substituting the distribution of
X,Xr, Yˆr, Yr, YD, YR into (26), we find that we need
σ2Q >
(a2 + 1) p+ 1
b2Pr (p+ 1)
(33)
It is clear from (31) that to make the region as large as possible, σ2Q should be as small as
possible, and (32) ensures this.
Remark 7: Suppose a > 1. Without the channel between relay and destination, we have a
wiretap channel where the eavesdropper has a better channel. Hence, the secrecy capacity is
zero [27]. We also know that a non-zero secrecy rate cannot be achieved with decode-and-
forward. However, if the relay to destination gain, b, is large enough, a non-zero secrecy rate
can be achieved with compress-and-forward, as can be seen from (31). This is an example
where the relay-to-destination link helps to achieve a non-zero secrecy rate when the relay and
the eavesdropper are co-located. Thus, the untrusted relay is useful and should be cooperated
with.
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Yr = aX + Zr
XS D
YD = X + ZD
YR = bβ(aX + Zr) + ZR
E
Fig. 6. The Equivalent Wiretap Channel of Model 2 using Amplify-and-forward Relaying
Remark 8: The scheme we present here differs from the noise forwarding scheme of [13]
where the relay transmits noise that is independent from its received signal. By contrast, in this
work, the signal transmitted by the relay is computed from its received signal.
Remark 9: The amplify and forward scheme can also be used at the relay. Let p be the average
transmission power of the source node. Then, in this case, the signal transmitted by the relay at
the ith channel use is given by
Xr,i = βYr,i−1, where β =
√
Pr√
a2p + 1
(34)
Note that in (34), we force Xr,i to depend on the signal received in the previous channel use
Yr,i−1 in order to preserve the causality of the relay function as defined in (1). However, because
the channel between the relay and the destination is orthogonal to the one between the source
and the destination, the fact that the signals received via YR is delayed by one channel use
compared to those received via YD does not make any difference to the destination. Therefore,
it is safe to write Xr = βYr and omit the subscript i.
The relay network is therefore equivalent to a Gaussian wiretap channel as shown in Figure 6.
The achievable secrecy rate is computed from [I(X ; YRYD) − I(X ; Yr)]+ [3] for a Gaussian
distribution for X: X ∼ N (0, p) and when maximized over p, the secrecy rate is given by:
Re < max
0≤p≤P
1
2
[
log (1 + (1 + ξ) p)− log
(
1 + a2p
)]+ (35)
where for β defined in (34), ξ is given by
ξ =
a2β2b2
1 + β2b2
(36)
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Fig. 7. Effect of Source Power Control
Observe that amplify-and-forward can also achieve a non-zero secrecy rate given a large enough
b. However, comparing it to (31), we find that the secrecy rate given by amplify-and-forward is
strictly smaller than the secrecy rate achievable by compress-and-forward.
Remark 10: When there are no secrecy constraints, for compress-and-forward/amplify-and-
forward, the source should always transmit at maximum power. However, when there are secrecy
constraints, for compress-and-forward/amplify-and-forward, the source may not transmit at max-
imum power. This can be shown as follows.
We first look at the case where there are no secrecy constraints. The rate for compress-and-
forward follows from the maximum possible value of R1 in Corollary 2, which is
R1 = max
0≤p≤P1
C
(
p+
a2p
1 + σ2Q
)
(37)
where σ2Q is given by (32). Recall that p is the average transmission power of the source node.
Hence we only need to show that
C
(
p+
a2p
1 + σ2Q
)
(38)
is a monotonic function of p which is proved in Appendix C. Hence to maximize R1 we should
choose p = P1.
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The rate for amplify-and-forward is derived by ignoring the eavesdropper in Figure 6. The
achievable rate is I(X ; YRYD), which, using the Gaussian input distribution for X , equals
max
0≤p≤P1
1
2
log (1 + (1 + ξ) p) (39)
where ξ is given by (36). To prove that (39) is maximized at p = P1, it is sufficient to prove
that ξp is a monotonically increasing function of p, which can be shown by rewriting ξp as:
a2p
1 + 1
β2b2
=
a2p
1 + a
2p+1
Prb2
=
a2
1+ 1
Prb2
p
+ a
2
Prb2
(40)
When there are secrecy constraints, the secrecy rate is not necessarily maximized at p = P1.
This can be observed in particular when b (the relay to destination link gain) is small. In this
case, for compress-and-forward, as shown in (32), the quantization noise σ2Q will increase more
rapidly with source power p. Similarly, for amplify-and-forward, the ξ in (36) will decrease more
rapidly with source power p. This, along with the negative term −C(a2p) present in (31) (35),
may offset the benefits of having a larger source power p. This phenomenon is demonstrated
numerically in Figure 7, where the source-to-relay channel gain a = 1.2. Both compress-and-
forward and amplify-and-forward can achieve a larger secrecy rate when power control is used
at the source. Moreover, compared to compress-and-forward, amplify-and-forward benefits more
from judicious power allocation at the source.
VI. UPPER BOUND FOR THE SECRECY RATE OF A SPECIAL CLASS OF MODEL 2
A. The Enhanced Channel
In this section, we describe the general methodology that we use to derive the upper bound.
Our upper bound involves introducing a second eavesdropper. The focus of this section is to
investigate the sufficient condition such that doing so will not decrease the secrecy capacity of
the channel. In Section VI-B, this will be useful in finding the upper bound for the secrecy rate
for a class of channels conforming to Model 2.
We focus on the case there is no feedback from the relay’s output Xr to its input Yr, which
means the conditional probability distribution of the channel should have the following form:
p(Yr|X)p(Y |X,Xr, Yr) (41)
Note that due to the absence of feedback, we drop the term Xr from the conditioning of Yr.
The reason that we choose this distribution to study will be clear shortly.
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Fig. 8. The Relay-Eavesdropper Separation Argument
Deriving the outer bound entails a “relay-eavesdropper separation” argument. In other words,
the net effect of this argument is to change the eavesdropper that is co-located with relay node,
to an eavesdropper that is external to the relay node. Illustrated in Figure 8, this means:
1) We add a second eavesdropper to the relay network, who sees a channel that is statistically
equivalent to the channel seen by the relay node. Let the signal received by this second
eavesdropper be Ye. That is, we have:
p(Yr|X,Xr) = p(Ye|X,Xr) (42)
2) We remove the first eavesdropper.
The reader, at this point, rightfully should question the validity of step 1). This is because,
as mentioned earlier, introducing a second eavesdropper, can decrease secrecy rate in general,
even if the second eavesdropper observes a statistically equivalent channel as in (42). This is
because the second eavesdropper may be able to hear the transmission signal Xr of the first
eavesdropper, and these two eavesdroppers can potentially cooperate. An example is provided
in Appendix D to demonstrate this phenomenon.
19
We next show that, for the channel model in (41), introducing a second eavesdropper, if done
with care, will not alter the secrecy capacity of the system. In particular, let the received signal
of the “second” eavesdropper Ye be defined as follows:
p(Yr|X)p(Y, Ye|X,Xr, Yr) (43)
s.t. p(Ye|X,Xr) = p(Ye|X) = p(Yr|X) (44)
Note that the second equality in (44) is (42) specialized for (41). We reiterate that though a Ye
conforming to these conditions may not exist for any arbitrary relay network, for the Gaussian
relay network models we are interested in, such a Ye can be found, as will be seen in the sequel
(See (86), (110), (113)).
For this choice of Ye, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4: For the relay channel defined by (41), (43)-(44) are sufficient for the secrecy
capacity of the channel after introducing the second eavesdropper to remain identical to the
secrecy capacity of the original channel.
Proof: Due to the addition of the second eavesdropper, we know that the secrecy capacity
of the new channel ≤ the secrecy capacity of the original channel. Therefore, we only need to
show that the secrecy capacity of the new channel ≥ the secrecy capacity of the original channel.
We use q to denote any distribution related to the new channel, and p for any distribution
related to the original channel. Suppose the new channel uses the exact same coding scheme and
the same message set {W} as the original channel. Then we can make the following statements:
1) Suppose W can be reliably received by the destination at a rate of Re in the original
channel. Then it must be reliably received by the receiver at the same rate in the new
channel as well, because these two channels share the same coding scheme and the same
channel statistics.
2) The transmitted message W is still secret from the first eavesdropper co-located with the
relay, since we are using the exact same coding scheme of the original channel.
3) We next show that H(W |Y ne ) of the new channel equals H(W |Y nr ) of the original channel.
To do that, it is sufficient to prove that q(Y ne |W ) of the new channel equals p(Y nr |W ) of
the original channel, as we show next:2
2 It is understood in the case of continuous random variable, the sum should be replaced by integral. In fact, both of them
can be expressed as integral by defining the measure properly.
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First we state two Markov chains, which are proved in Appendix E.
Yr,i −Xi −X]i[Y i−1r,1
Ye,i −Xi −X]i[Y i−1e,1
(45)
We have:
q (Y ne |W )
=
∑
Xn
q (Y ne |Xn) q (Xn|W ) (46)
=
∑
Xn
n∏
i=1
q
(
Ye,i|Xn, Y i−1e,1
)
q (Xn|W ) (47)
(a)
=
∑
Xn
n∏
i=1
q (Ye,i|Xi) q (Xn|W ) (48)
(b)
=
∑
Xn
n∏
i=1
p (Yr,i|Xi) p (Xn|W ) (49)
(c)
=
∑
Xn
n∏
i=1
p
(
Yr,i|Xn, Y i−1r,1
)
p (Xn|W ) (50)
=
∑
Xn
p (Y nr |Xn) p (Xn|W ) (51)
=p (Y nr |W ) (52)
Here step (a) follows from the Markov chain Ye,i−Xi −X]i[Y i−1e,1 . Step (b) follows from
the fact that these two channels share the same coding scheme, p(Xn|W ) = q(Xn|W ),
and the constraint we placed on the marginal distribution q(Ye|X) = p(Yr|X). Step (c)
follows the Markov chain Yr,i −Xi −X]i[Y i−1r,1 .
The fact that introducing an eavesdropper does not reduce the secrecy capacity can then be seen
from the following relationship:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I (W ; Y nr X
n
r ) ≥ limn→∞
1
n
I (W ; Y nr ) = limn→∞
1
n
I (W ; Y ne ) ≥ 0 (53)
If lim
n→∞
1
n
I (W ; Y nr X
n
r ) = 0, then 1nI (W ; Y
n
e ) = 0. Therefore, for a given coding scheme, if
W is kept secret from the eavesdropper at the relay, it is also kept secret from the newly
introduced eavesdropper. Hence any secrecy rate achievable in the original channel is achievable
after introducing the second eavesdropper. This means the secrecy capacity remains the same.
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Theorem 4 shows that if the relay is not self-interfering, adding an eavesdropper as described in
step 1 will not incur any loss in secrecy rate. This, along will step 2, will result in an “enhanced”
channel whose secrecy rate is an upper bound to that of the original channel.
Remark 11: Actually, for the channel model in (41), we have
H(W |Y nr , Xnr ) = H(W |Y nr ) (54)
This means the secrecy capacity of the channel model in can be computed via limn→∞ 1nH(W |Y nr )
instead. This is proved in Appendix F.
Remark 12: Note that the conditional probability distribution of the relay channel p(Y, Yr|X,Xr)
is left intact. The benefit of the separation argument is that we have freedom in choosing Ye, as
long as it conforms to (43) and (44). Choosing Ye properly allows us to tighten the bound.
B. Upper Bound for a Special Class of Model 2
We next use the result we derived in Section VI-A to upper bound the secrecy rate of a class
of relay channels. This class, as we mentioned earlier, is given by (16), which can be specialized
from (41). Equation (43) becomes:
p(YD, YR, Yr, Ye|X,Xr) = p(YD|X)p(Yr|X, YD)p(YR|Xr)p(Ye|X, YD, Yr) (55)
p(Yr|X) = p(Ye|X) (56)
Definition 1: Define P as the set of joint probability distribution functions of YD, YR, Yr, Ye, X,Xr
such that (55) and (56) are fulfilled.
With this definition, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5: For the relay channel defined in (16), where the relay is the eavesdropper, the
secrecy rate Re is upper bounded by
max
p(X,Xr)
min


I (X ; YD|Yr)
I (Xr; YR) + minP
I (X ; YD|Ye)

 (57)
Proof: The first term can be obtained by specializing the result from [21]. Reference [21,
version 7,(13)] claims for a general relay p(Y, Yr|X,Xr), the secrecy rate is upper bounded by
Re ≤ I(X ; Y |Yr, Xr) (58)
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Specializing it to our channel, which means replacing Y with YD, YR, we have
I (X ; YD, YR|Yr, Xr) (59)
≤I (X ; YR|Yr, Xr) + I (X ; YD|Yr, Xr, YR) (60)
From (55), X − {Yr, Xr} − YR is a Markov chain. Hence (60) equals:
I (X ; YD|Yr, Xr, YR) (61)
=h (YD|Yr, Xr, YR)− h (YD|Yr, Xr, X, YR) (62)
≤h (YD|Yr)− h (YD|Yr, Xr, X, YR) (63)
From (55), YD − {X, Yr} − {Xr, YR} is a Markov chain. Hence (63) equals
h (YD|Yr)− h (YD|X, Yr) = I (X ; YD|Yr) (64)
Hence we have proved the first term.
Next, we proceed to bound the second term:
H (W |Y ne )
(a)
≤I (W ; Y nDY nR |Y ne ) + nε1 (65)
=I (W ; Y nD |Y ne ) + I (W ; Y nR |Y ne Y nD) + nε1 (66)
≤I (WXn; Y nD |Y ne ) + I (WXnr ; Y nR |Y ne Y nD) + nε1 (67)
=I (Xn; Y nD |Y ne ) + I (WXnr ; Y nR |Y ne Y nD) + nε1 (68)
=I (Xn; Y nD |Y ne ) + h (Y nR |Y ne Y nD)−
n∑
i=1
h
(
YR,i|Y ne Y nDXnr Y i−1R,1 W
)
+ nε1 (69)
(b)
=I (Xn; Y nD |Y ne ) + h (Y nR |Y ne Y nD)−
n∑
i=1
h (YR,i|Xr,i) + nε1 (70)
≤I (Xn; Y nD |Y ne ) +
n∑
i=1
(h (YR,i)− h (YR,i|Xr,i)) + nε1 (71)
=h (Y nD |Y ne )−
n∑
i=1
h
(
YD,i|Y ne XnY i−1D,1
)
+
n∑
i=1
I (Xr,i; YR,i) + nε1 (72)
(c)
=h (Y nD |Y ne )−
n∑
i=1
h (YD,i|Ye,iXi) +
n∑
i=1
I (Xr,i; YR,i) + nε1 (73)
≤
n∑
i=1
I (Xi; YD,i|Ye,i) +
n∑
i=1
I (Xr,i; YR,i) + nε1 (74)
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=nI (X ; YD|Ye, Q) + I (Xr; YR|Q) + nε1 (75)
=nh (YD|Ye, Q)− nh (YD|Ye, X) + nh (YR|Q)− nh (YR|Xr) + nε1 (76)
≤nh (YD|Ye)− nh (YD|Ye, X) + nh (YR)− nh (YR|Xr) + nε1 (77)
=nI (X ; YD|Ye) + nI (Xr; YR) + nε1 (78)
Here step (a) follows from Fano’s inequality. Step (b) follows from the relay destination link
being orthogonal to the rest part of the channel. Step (c) follows from the fact that the relay is
not interfering the second eavesdropper. Therefore given {Ye,i, Xi}, the signals {Ye,j, j > i} do
not provide further information about YD,i.
Remark 13: Another upper bound that can be obtained is
I (X ; YDYr|Ye) (79)
which is proved in Appendix G, and it can be further tightened by choosing Ye. However, as
shown below this upper bound does not improve the first term in (57).
I (X ; YDYr|Ye)
=I (X ; YDYrYe)− I (X ; Ye) (80)
(b)
=I (X ; YDYrYe)− I (X ; Yr) (81)
≥I (X ; YDYr)− I (X ; Yr) (82)
=I (X ; YD|Yr) (83)
Step (b) follows from p(Yr|X) = p(Ye|X).
C. The Gaussian Case of Model 2
Using Theorem 5, we now evaluate the upper bound for the Gaussian channel.
Corollary 3: For the Gaussian case of Model 2, which has independent noise components,
the upper bound on secrecy rate is:
min
{
C(b2P ) + [C(P )− C(a2P )]+, C
(
P
1 + a2P
)}
(84)
Proof: First we notice that (57) is upper bounded by:
min


max
p(X,Xr)
I (X ; YD|Yr)
max
p(Xr)
I (Xr; YR) + minP
max
p(X,Xr)
I (X ; YD|Ye)

 (85)
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Fig. 9. Secrecy Rate of the Gaussian Orthogonal Relay Channel
Since p(Ye|X) = p(Yr|X), we define a Gaussian random variable Ne such that
Ye = aX +Ne (86)
Then the set P can be re-parametrized with the correlation between Ne, Nr and the correlation
between Ne, ND. For a given correlation, it is known that I(X ; YD|Ye) and I(X ; YrYD|Ye) are
both maximized with Gaussian distribution [5, Appendix II]. The first term in (85) then becomes
1
2
log2
(
1 + P
1+a2P
)
. To obtain the second term inside the minimum, we choose Ne/a2 = ND+N ′,
with N ′, ND being independent if a < 1, otherwise we choose ND = Ne/a2 +N ′, with N ′, Ne
being independent, where N ′ is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with appropriate variance.
In Figure 9, we compare the upper bound with the achievable rates for the Gaussian case
of Model 2. We fix the source-to-relay channel gain a = 1, and vary the relay-to-destination
channel gain b. As b→∞, we observe that the upper bound becomes tight. As b→ 0, the upper
bound decreases. This improvement is due to the first term in Corollary 3.
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VII. THE COVER-KIM DETERMINISTIC RELAY CHANNEL
In this section, we investigate the Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel of [24], [28] whose
capacity is established therein. The channel was defined in Figure 5 in Section III.
For the achievable secrecy rate, we have the next theorem.
Theorem 6: For the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic channel, the following secrecy rate is
achievable:
[
R0 + C (P )− C
(
α2P
)]+ (87)
Proof: Let C be a random code book with 2⌊n[R0+C(P )−C(α2P)]
+⌋2⌊nC(α
2P)⌋ codewords
sampled from an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance P . These codewords
are randomly partitioned into 2⌊n[R0+C(P )−C(α2P)]
+⌋ bins of equal size. The bin index of the
transmitted codeword is determined by the message W . The actual transmitted codeword is then
selected randomly from this bin according to a uniform distribution. The relay uses either hash-
and-forward or compress-and-forward as described in [24]. Let E[Pe|C] be the average error
probability over the codebook ensemble {C} that the destination could not correctly determine
Xn, hence W , from Y nD and side information provided by the relay. It was proved in [24] that
limn→∞E[Pe|C] = 0.
Since each bin is a Gaussian codebook by itself whose rate is below the AWGN channel
capacity between the source and the relay, the relay node can determine Xn given W and Y nr
with high probability using jointly typical decoding. Therefore, from Fano’s inequality, we have
H (Xn|WY nr C) ≤ nε1. Thus:
H (W |Y nr C) =H (XnW |Y nr C)−H (Xn|WY nr C) (88)
≥H (XnW |Y nr C)− nε1 (89)
=H (Xn|Y nr C) +H (W |XnY nr C)− nε1 (90)
=H (Xn|Y nr C)− nε1 (91)
=H (Xn|C)− I (Xn; Y nr |C)− nε1 (92)
≥H (Xn|C)− I (Xn; Y nr )− nε1 (93)
≥H (Xn|C)−
n∑
i=1
I (Xi; Yr,i)− nε1 (94)
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Since each code word is selected with equal probability, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
H (Xn|C) = C(P ) +R0 (95)
Also, I (Xi; Yr,i) = C(α2P ). Substituting this and (95) into (94), dividing it by n and taking
the limit n→∞, we have (87), which equals limn→∞ 1nH(W |C). Therefore limn→∞E[Pe|C] +
1
n
I(W ; Y nr |C) = 0. Since both terms inside the limit are non-negative, this proves the existence
of at least one codebook with a rate of [R0 + C (P )− C (α2P )]+ such that both terms are
arbitrarily small. Hence we have proved the theorem.
Theorem 7: The secrecy rate of the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic channel is upper bounded
by
R0 +
[
C (P )− C
(
α2P
)]+ (96)
Proof: We use Theorem 4 to separate the eavesdropper and the relay. Let Ye be the signal
received by the eavesdropper such that (55) and (56) are met. Then, we have:
H (W |Y ne )
(a)
≤I (W ; Y nDXnR|Y ne ) + nε1 (97)
=I (W ; Y nD |Y ne ) + I (W ;XnR|Y ne Y nD) + nε1 (98)
≤I (W ; Y nD |Y ne ) +H (XnR) + nε1 (99)
≤I (WXn; Y nD |Y ne ) +H (XnR) + nε1 (100)
=I (Xn; Y nD |Y ne ) +H (XnR) + nε1 (101)
=h (Y nD |Y ne )−
n∑
i=1
h
(
YD,i|Y ne XnY i−1D,1
)
+H (XnR) + nε1 (102)
(b)
=h (Y nD |Y ne )−
n∑
i=1
h (YD,i|Ye,iXi) +H (XnR) + nε1 (103)
≤
n∑
i=1
I (Xi; YD,i|Ye,i) +H (XnR) + nε1 (104)
=nI (X ; YD|Ye, Q) +H (XnR) + nε1 (105)
=nh (YD|Ye, Q)− nh (YD|Ye, X) +H (XnR) + nε1 (106)
≤nh (YD|Ye)− nh (YD|Ye, X) +H (XnR) + nε1 (107)
=nI (X ; YD|Ye) +H (XnR) + nε1 (108)
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≤nI (X ; YD|Ye) + nR0 + nε2 (109)
Step (a) follows from Fano’s inequality. Step (b) follows from the fact that the relay is not
interfering with, i.e., heard by the (second) eavesdropper. Therefore, given {Ye,i, Xi}, signals
{Ye,j, j > i} will not provide more information about YD,i.
The bound is further tightened by choosing Ye properly.
1) If α ≥ 1, then
Ye = αX + Z (110)
YD = X +
Z
α
+ Z ′ (111)
Yr = X − Z
α
− Z ′ (112)
Z ′ is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance |1− 1
α2
|, and Z ′ is independent
from Z.
2) If α ≤ 1, then
Ye = X + Z + Z
′ (113)
Z ′ is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with variance |1− 1
α2
|, and Z ′ is independent
from Z.
Substituting these choices of Ye into (109), we get (96).
Remark 14: Inspecting (87) and (96), we see that the upper bound and the achievable rate
coincide when α ≤ 1. Hence, for α ≤ 1, i.e, when the source to destination link is not worse
than the source to the relay link, the secrecy capacity is achieved by compress-and-forward.
Remark 15: The secrecy capacity can exceed the direct link capacity if R0 > C(P ). This is
a benefit of the correlation of the noises corrupting the links from the source. If the noises are
independent, the secrecy capacity cannot exceed C(P ), as proved next:
Observation 1: If the relay channel has the property:
p (YR, YD, Yr|X,Xr) = p (YR|Xr) p (Yr|X) p (YD|X) (114)
Then Re ≤ I (X ; YD)
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Fig. 10. Secrecy rate for the Gaussian Cover-Kim Deterministic Relay channel
Proof: From (57), we have
Re ≤ I (X ; YD|Xr) (115)
= h (YD|Xr)− h (YD|Xr, X) (116)
= h (YD|Yr)− h (YD|X) (117)
≤ I (X ; YD) (118)
where in (117) we use the Markov chain YD −X − Yr.
We conclude this section by presenting Figure 10 which shows the upper bound and the
achievable rate for R0 = 0.5 bits/channel use and P = 1. As expected, the two meet for α ≤ 1,
yielding the secrecy capacity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the relay channel with an untrusted relay that is treated
as an eavesdropper. In particular, we focused on two relay channel models with orthogonal
components. For the first model, we have found the capacity-equivocation region and proved
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that the relay-destination link does not help in increasing secrecy rate, and therefore the untrusted
relay should not be deployed if perfect secrecy is desired. In contrast, for the second model, we
have found an achievable secrecy rate which calls relay’s cooperation and improves the secrecy
rate as compared to treating it simply as an eavesdropping node. Thus, we conclude that, for this
model, the untrusted relay may help the source and the destination to communicate despite being
subjected to the secrecy constraint, and that cooperation with the untrusted relay is beneficial.
We have provided a channel transformation that separates the relay and the eavesdropper to
upper bound the secrecy rate for a special class of untrusted relay channels. We have found this
approach to be useful in upper bounding the secrecy rate for two cases: For the Gaussian relay
channel with an orthogonal relay-destination link, this new approach yields a computable bound
that tightens previously known bounds. For the Gaussian Cover-Kim deterministic relay channel,
we have shown that this approach finds the secrecy capacity when the source-destination link is
not worse than the source-relay link.
Since the first example demonstrating the potential benefit of cooperating with an untrusted
relay [29], there has been recent growing interest in communication models with untrusted relays.
Notable recent developments include work on the multiple access channel with generalized
feedback [30] and relay broadcast channel [31], [32], where, in addition to the secret message
considered in this work, the untrusted relay node has its own secret message. The role of untrusted
relay is examined in bi-directional communication in [33], [34], where the relay node in a two-
way relay network is untrusted. A case for the communication scenario with multiple untrusted
relay nodes is recently presented in [35], [36], where the source and the destination can only
communicate via a chain of untrusted relay nodes. All these works, like this paper we are about
to conclude, speaks to the merit of cooperative communication even with untrusted partners, and
that cooperation and secrecy can go hand in hand.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The achievable scheme of Theorem 1 is a combination of stochastic encoding at the source
node and compress-and-forward at the relay node. The compress-and-forward relaying scheme
is the same one described in [25]. The achievable scheme involves N blocks of channel uses.
Each block is composed of n channel uses.
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A. Codebook Generation
1) The Codebook of the Source Node: The source uses a codebook composed of i.i.d.
sequences sampled from the distribution p(X). Each codeword has n components. In order
to confuse the relay/eavesdropper, the codebook is further partitioned randomly to bins. Suppose
there are 2nC bins. Each bin contains 2nB codewords. B is chosen such that:
nB = ⌊nI(X ; Yr|Xr)⌋ (119)
The reason behind this choice will be clear shortly. Each codeword is hence indexed by the
label {b, c}, where c is the bin index and b indexes the codeword within the bin. The rate of the
codebook is given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
log2 |Xn| = limn→∞B + C = I (X ; Yr|Xr) + limn→∞C (120)
2) The Codebook of the Relay [25]:
i) The signal transmitted by the relay is from a codebook composed of i.i.d. sequences
sampled from the distribution p(Xr). Each codeword has n components and is denoted by
Xnr (d). The codebook has 2nD codewords.
ii) For each d, we generate 2nE codewords, each with n components, denoted by Yˆr(e|d).
The ith component of the codeword is drawn from p(Yˆr|Xr = Xnr,i(d)) in an i.i.d. fashion.
iii) For each d, we randomly bin the label e into 2nD bins and label each bin with a d according
to uniform distribution. This random binning is used for Wyner-Ziv coding.
We use C to denote the random codebooks generated for the source and the relay.
B. Stochastic Encoder at the Source Node
The codeword transmitted as the kth block is indexed by label bk, ck, where ck is the bin
index and bk indexes the codeword within the bin. Let W (k) be the message transmitted at the
kth block. Recall that R1 is the rate of the message W (k). Hence R1 = log2 |W (k)|/n. The
messages are mapped to the codewords as follows.
i) If R1 > C, ck is the bin index determined by W (k). The codewords in bin ck are partitioned
into 2n(R1−C) subsets. The subset is chosen according to the unmapped part of W (k). Then
bk is selected from this chosen subset according to a uniform distribution.
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ii) If R1 ≤ C, ck is still determined by W (k). bk is randomly chosen from group ck according
to a uniform distribution.
For this mapping, we observe that the cardinality of ck is 2nmin{R1,C}.
Only N−1 messages W (1)...W (N−1) are transmitted over N blocks. During the last block,
the relay and the source agrees that the source will send message 1.
C. Compress-and-forward at the relay [25]
During the kth block, the relay node first compresses Y nr (k) to Yˆ nr (ek|dk). Yˆ nr is indexed by
two labels: ek and dk. dk is chosen to be the label that corresponds to Xnr (k). Hence a different
set of Yˆ nr , of size 2nE, is used for compression depending on the value of Xnr (k). The label ek
is chosen to be the first element in the following set:
{
e : Yˆ nr (e|dk) , Y nr (k) , Xnr (k) are jointly typical
}
(121)
If the set is empty, ek = 1. The size of the codebook Yˆ nr (e|dk) should be sufficiently large for
the set to be nonempty, which requires E > I(Yˆr; Yr|Xr) [25].
Label ek is transmitted during the k+1st block. At this time the destination has received Y n(k),
and can decode Xnr (k). Since {Y n(k), Xnr (k)} provide side information to the destination about
ek, ek can be compressed further before transmission. This is done via Wyner-Ziv coding. Recall
that the set {e, d = dk} is randomly binned. The size of each bin should be chosen such that the
destination can decode ek, and hence determine Yˆ nr (k) from this bin from the side information
{Y n(k), Xnr (k)}. This requires I(Yˆr; Y |Xr) > E −D. Only the bin index is transmitted. Recall
that each bin is labeled with d. Hence this determines dk+1, which determines Xnr (k + 1).
Remark 16: One important aspect of this coding scheme is that the signals transmitted by
the relay during different blocks {Xnr (k), k = 1...N − 1} are correlated. This is because, as
described in the coding scheme at the relay, each Xnr (k) is determined from Yˆ nr (ek−1|dk−1),
which is shown in (121) to be related to Xnr (k−1). Because of the self interference at the relay,
the signals received by the relay during different blocks {Y nr (k), k = 1...N − 1} are correlated
as well. However, Y nr (k) is correlated with past Y nr (p), p < k only through Xnr (k). This property
will be useful in bounding the equivocation rate.
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D. Decoder at the Destination
Recall that the short hand W (a, ..., b) stands for the set {W (a),W (a + 1), ...,W (b)}. The
short hand W a stands for the set {W (1),W (2), ...,W (a)}.
The destination first decodes Xn(N−1). The decoding at the kth block happens as: It first
decodes Xnr (k) from Y n(k). For this, we require D < I(Xr; Y ). It then determines dk from
Xnr (k), which determines the bin that contains ek−1. It next determines ek−1 by finding the label
e in this bin such that Yˆ nr (e|dk−1) is joint typical with {Y n(k−1), Xnr (k−1)}. This determines
Yˆ nr (ek−1|dk−1). Finally Xn(k−1) is decoded from Y n(k−1), Yˆ nr (k−1), Xnr (k−1). For details,
the reader is referred to [25, Theorem 6].
Let the decoding result be Xˆn(N−1). According to error probability analysis in [25], if the rate
of the codebook of the source meets the condition:
lim
n→∞
1
n
log2 |Xn| < I(X ; Yˆr, Y |Xr) (122)
and the following condition is fulfilled:
I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Y Xr) (123)
then
lim
n→∞E[Pr(Xˆ
n(N−1) 6= Xn(N−1)|C)] = 0 (124)
The expectation is taken over the random codebook C.
Combining (122) and (120), we have:
I(X ; Yr|Xr) + lim
n→∞C < I(X ; Yˆr, Y |Xr) (125)
The destination then computes WˆN−1 from Xˆn(N−1), since the former is a deterministic
function of the latter. The average probability of decoding error for W n(N−1) is hence upper
bounded by the average probability of decoding error of Xn(N−1). Therefore equation (124)
implies:
lim
n→∞E[Pr(Wˆ
N−1 6= WN−1|C)] = 0 (126)
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E. Equivocation Computation
Let cN−1 denote {c1, c2, ..., cN−1}. The computation of the equivocation rate starts from the
following expression:
H(cN−1|Y nNr , XnNr , C) (127)
=H(cN−1|Y n(N−1)r , XnNr , C) (128)
=H(cN−1|Y n(N−1)r , Xn(N−1)r , C) (129)
Here, the first equality follows from the fact that conditioned on Xnr (N), the signals Y nr (N) are
independent from Y n(N−1)r , Xn(N−1)r , cN−1. The second equality is because, as described in the
relaying scheme above, Xnr (N) is a deterministic function of Y nr (N − 1) and Xnr (N − 1).
To simplify the notation, we omit the C from the conditioning term in the derivation below
and only mention it when necessary.
Equation (129) can be reformulated as:
H
(
cN−1|Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
(130)
=−H
(
X(N−1)n|cN−1, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
+H
(
cN−1|X(N−1)n, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
+H
(
X(N−1)n|Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
(131)
=−H
(
X(N−1)n|cN−1, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
+H
(
X(N−1)n|Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
(132)
=−H
(
X(N−1)n|cN−1, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
+H
(
X(N−1)n
)
− I
(
X(N−1)n; Y (N−1)nr , X
(N−1)n
r
)
(133)
From the description of the stochastic encoder at the source node, we observe that each block
Xn(i), i = 1, ..., N − 1 is independent from each other. Hence the second term in (133) can be
expressed as:
H
(
X(N−1)n
)
=
N−1∑
i=1
H(Xn(i)) (134)
From the codebook used by the source node, we observe that
H(Xn(i)) = n(B +min{C,R1}) (135)
Therefore
H
(
X(N−1)n
)
= (N − 1)n(B +min{C,R1}) (136)
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The first term in (133) can be upper bounded as:
H
(
X(N−1)n|cN−1, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
(137)
=
N−1∑
i=1
H
(
Xn(i)|X(i−1)n, cN−1, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
(138)
≤
N−1∑
i=1
H (Xn(i)|ci, Y nr (i), Xnr (i)) (139)
Recall that Xn(i) is determined by two indexes: bi and ci. The label ci is already on the condition
term. To determine bi, we notice from (119) that:
B ≤ I(X ; Yr|Xr) (140)
With this constraint, for a given codebook C, which is on the condition term implicitly, the
eavesdropper can estimate bi from the following set:
{b : Xn(b, ci), Y nr (i), Xnr (i) are jointly typical} (141)
This set should contain only bk with probability close to 1. From Fano’s inequality, we have
H (Xn(i)|ci, Y nr (i), Xnr (i)) ≤ nε1, where ε1 > 0 and limn→∞ ε1 = 0. Therefore from (137)-
(139), we have:
H
(
X(N−1)n|cN−1, Y (N−1)nr , X(N−1)nr
)
< (N − 1)nε1 (142)
The third term in (133) can be upper bounded as follows:
I
(
X(N−1)n; Y (N−1)nr , X
(N−1)n
r
)
(143)
=
N−1∑
i=1
I
(
X(N−1)n; Y nr (i) , X
n
r (i) |Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr
)
(144)
=
N−1∑
i=1
I
(
X(N−1)n; Y nr (i) |Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr , Xnr (i)
)
+ I
(
X(N−1)n;Xnr (i) |Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr
)
(145)
For compress-and-forward relaying, as explained in the previous section, Xnr (i) is a deterministic
function of Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr . Hence the second term in (145) is zero. (145) therefore equals:
N−1∑
i=1
I
(
X(N−1)n; Y nr (i) |Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr , Xnr (i)
)
(146)
≤
N−1∑
i=1
h (Y nr (i) |Xnr (i))− h
(
Y nr (i) |Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr , Xnr (i) , X(N−1)n
)
(147)
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From the coding scheme described in Section A-C, we observe Y nr (i) depends on {Y (i−1)nr ,
X(i−1)nr , X
n(1, ..., i− 1), Xn(i+ 1, ...n)} only through Xnr (i), Xn(i). Hence
Y nr (i)− {Xnr (i) , Xn (i)} − {Y (i−1)nr , X(i−1)nr , Xn (1, ..., i− 1) , Xn (i+ 1, ..., n)} (148)
is a Markov chain. Therefore (147) equals:
N−1∑
i=1
h (Y nr (i) |Xnr (i))− h (Y nr (i) |Xnr (i) , Xn (i)) (149)
=
N−1∑
i=1
I (Xn (i) ; Y nr (i) |Xnr (i)) (150)
≤(N − 1)(nI(X ; Yr|Xr) + nε2) (151)
where where ε2 > 0 and limn→∞ ε2 = 0. Equation (151) follows from the fact the channel is
memoryless and the codebook is composed of i.i.d. sequences.
Applying (142), (136) and (151) to (133), we have
H(cN−1|Y nNr , XnNr , C) (152)
≥(N − 1)n(B +min{C,R1})− (N − 1)nε1 − (N − 1)(nI(X ; Yr|Xr) + nε2) (153)
≥(N − 1)n(min{C,R1})− (N − 1)n(ε1 + ε2) (154)
=H(cN−1|C)− (N − 1)n(ε1 + ε2) (155)
Equation (154) follows from (140). (155) is because ck in each block is chosen independently
of other blocks, ck is chosen according to a uniform distribution from a set with a cardinality
of 2nmin{C,R1}.
From (152)-(155), we have:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(cN−1; Y nNr , X
nN
r |C) = 0 (156)
Combining it with (126) we have
lim
n→∞E[Pr(Wˆ
N−1 6= WN−1|C)] + 1
n
I(cN−1; Y nNr , X
nN
r |C) = 0 (157)
Therefore, there must exists a codebook C∗ such that
lim
n→∞E[Pr(Wˆ
N−1 6= WN−1|C∗)] + 1
n
I(cN−1; Y nNr , X
nN
r |C∗) = 0 (158)
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Since each term on the left side of (158) are nonnegative, it follows that with this codebook:
lim
n→∞E[Pr(Wˆ
N−1 6= WN−1|C∗)] = 0 (159)
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(cN−1; Y nNr , X
nN
r |C∗) = 0 (160)
For the simplicity of notation, we omit C∗ from the conditioning term. It is understood that all
the derivations below are conditioned on C∗.
Since cN−1 is a deterministic function of WN−1, we have
H(WN−1|Y nNr , XnNr , C)
=H(cN−1,WN−1|Y nNr , XnNr , C) (161)
≥H(cN−1|Y nNr , XnNr , C) (162)
≥(N − 1)n(min{C,R1})− (N − 1)n(ε1 + ε2) (163)
Hence,
Re = lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
1
nN
H
(
WN−1|Y nNr , XnNr
)
(164)
≥ min
{
lim
n→∞C,R1
}
(165)
The achievable region can then be discussed for two cases:
i) R1 ≤ limn→∞C
ii) R1 > limn→∞C
When R1 ≤ limn→∞C, the region (R1, Re) is given by:
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1
0 ≤ R1 ≤ lim
n→∞C
(166)
where limn→∞C meets the following condition from (125):
0 ≤ lim
n→∞C < [I
(
X ; Y, Yˆr|Xr
)
− I(X ; Yr|Xr)]+ (167)
subject to the constraint I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Y Xr). When R1 > limn→∞C, the region (R1, Re)
is given by:
0 ≤ Re ≤ lim
n→∞C
lim
n→∞C < R1 ≤ limn→∞C + I(X ; Yr|Xr)
(168)
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Finally, the union of these two regions (166) and (168) becomes the region given below:
Re ≤ R1 < I
(
X ; Y, Yˆr|Xr
)
0 ≤ Re < [I
(
X ; Y, Yˆr|Xr
)
− I (X ; Yr|Xr)]+
(169)
with the constraint I(Xr; Y ) > I(Yˆr; Yr|Y Xr).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The converse for R1 is given in [22] using the cut set bound. The converse for Re can be
derived by specializing the upper bound in [21], which is stated in (58) as I(X ; Y |Xr, Yr). For
our model, this can be upper bounded as:
I (X ; Y |Yr, Xr) = I (XR, XD; Y |Yr, Xr) (170)
= h (Y |Yr, Xr)− h (Y |Yr, Xr, XR, XD) (171)
From (12), Y −XD, Xr − Yr, XR is a Markov chain. Hence (171) equals:
h (Y |Yr, Xr)− h (Y |Xr, XD) (172)
≤ h (Y |Xr)− h (Y |Xr, XD) (173)
= I (XD; Y |Xr) (174)
Hence we have proved the converse for Re.
The achievability of (21) also follows from the partial decode-and-forward scheme presented
in reference [21, Theorem 1].
Theorem 8: [21, Theorem 1] The following region is achievable:
⋃
p(U,X,Xr)
p(Yr ,Y |X,Xr)


R1 < I (X ; Y |U,Xr) + min{I (U ; Yr|Xr) , I (U,Xr; Y )}
Re < [I (X ; Y |U,Xr)− I (X ; Yr|U,Xr)]+
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1


(175)
In (175), we let X = {XD, XR}, U = XR, and restrict the union to be over the probability
distributions of the form p(Xr)p(XD|Xr)p(XR|Xr), and we obtain:
I (X ; Y |U,Xr)− I (X ; Yr|U,Xr) (176)
=I (XRXD; Y |XRXr)− I (XRXD; Yr|XRXr) (177)
=I (XD; Y |XRXr)− I (XD; Yr|XRXr) (178)
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=H (Y |XRXr)−H (Y |XDXRXr)− I (XD; Yr|XRXr) (179)
(a)
=H (Y |Xr)−H (Y |XDXr)− I (XD; Yr|XRXr) (180)
=I (XD; Y |Xr)− I (XD; Yr|XRXr) (181)
(b)
=I (XD; Y |Xr) (182)
where step (a) follows from XR − Xr − Y being a Markov chain [22] and XR − XrXD − Y
being a Markov chain. Step (b) follows from XD − XRXr − Yr being a Markov chain [22].
Moreover, the bound on R1 can be expressed as:
I (X ; Y |U,Xr) + min{I (U ; Yr|Xr) , I (U,Xr; Y )} (183)
=min
{
I (UXXr; Y ) , I (U ; Yr|Xr) + I (X ; Y |U,Xr)
}
(184)
(c)
=min
{
I (XXr; Y ) , I (U ; Yr|Xr) + I (X ; Y |U,Xr)
}
(185)
where step (c) follows from U −XXr − Y being a Markov chain.
Note that (185) is the same as [22, (2)], therefore from the same argument therein, we obtain:
min
{
I (XXr; Y ) , I (U ; Yr|Xr) + I (X ; Y |U,Xr)
}
(186)
=min
{
I (XD, Xr; Y ) , I (XR; Yr|Xr) + I (XD; Y |Xr)
}
(187)
By substituting (187) and (182) into (175), we find that the rate pair in (21) is achievable.
Remark 17: It is shown in [21, Lemma 3] that the achievable rate region (175) is convex.
Therefore the rate region (21) is also convex.
APPENDIX C
PROOF THAT (38) IS A MONOTONIC INCREASING FUNCTION OF THE SOURCE POWER
It suffices to show that the argument of C( ), which is p+ a2p
1+σ2
Q
, is a monotonically increasing
function of p. The expression of σ2Q is given by (32). Thus we have:
p+
a2p
1 + σ2Q
= p
(
(1 + a2) (b2Pr + 1) (p+ 1)− a2
(b2Pr + a2 + 1) (p+ 1)− a2
)
(188)
Since p+ a2p
1+σ2
Q
is always positive, we can prove its monotonicity in p by showing ln(p+ a2p
1+σ2
Q
)
is monotonically increasing in p. From (188), it is given by
ln p+ ln
((
1 + a2
) (
b2Pr + 1
)
(p+ 1)− a2
)
− ln
((
b2Pr + a
2 + 1
)
(p + 1)− a2
)
(189)
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Let A ∆= (1 + a2) (b2Pr + 1). Let B
∆
= (b2Pr + a
2 + 1). Then the derivative of (189) with respect
to p is given by
1
p
+
a2
(
1
A
− 1
B
)
(
p+ 1− a2
A
) (
p+ 1− a2
B
) =
(
p+ 1− a2
A
) (
p+ 1− a2
B
)
+ a2
(
1
A
− 1
B
)
p
p
(
p+ 1− a2
A
) (
p+ 1− a2
B
) (190)
Note that A,B > a2. Hence the denominator of (190) is positive. Therefore we only need to
show that the numerator of (190) is positive. The numerator of (190) equals
(p+ 1)2 − a2
(
1
A
+
1
B
)
(p+ 1) +
a4
AB
+ a2
(
1
A
− 1
B
)
p (191)
= (p+ 1)2 − 2a
2
B
p+
a4
AB
− a2
(
1
A
+
1
B
)
(192)
=
(
p + 1− a
2
B
)2
− a
4
B
(
1
B
− 1
A
)
+ a2
(
1
B
− 1
A
)
(193)
=
(
p + 1− a
2
B
)2
+ a2
(
1− a
2
B
)(
1
B
− 1
A
)
(194)
Since A > B > a2, a2/B < 1, (194) is positive. Therefore the derivative of ln(p + a2p
1+σ2
Q
) with
respect to p is positive. This means (38) is a monotonic increasing function of p.
APPENDIX D
AN EXAMPLE WHERE INTRODUCING A SECOND EAVESDROPPER DECREASES SECRECY
CAPACITY
Consider a special case of Model 2 defined by
Yr = X +N YD = X −N (195)
YR = Xr (196)
This is a Gaussian relay channel with orthogonal components with reversely correlated noise.
N is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with unit variance. Hence its probability density
function is symmetric around the origin: p(−N) = p(N).
We first observe that since the orthogonal link between the relay and the destination is
noiseless, the optimal relaying scheme in this case is choosing Xr,i = Yr,i−1. This can be proved
as follows: First we recognize, for this channel, given Y nr , the signals Xnr do not provide more
information to the eavesdropper. This is because the relay is not interfering itself and hence as
shown in Remark 11, the secrecy capacity can be computed from limn→∞ 1nH(W |Y nr ) instead,
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i.e., Xnr can be dropped from the conditioning term. Therefore for any given relay scheme, we
can always use Xr,i = Yr,i−1 to give the destination the signals received by the relay, and ask the
destination to to compute the Xnr generated from the original relaying scheme instead. It can be
verified that in this way the secrecy constraint is fulfilled and W can still be transmitted reliably.
Therefore, the secrecy rate achievable by any given relay scheme is achievable via Xr,i = Yr,i−1,
which must be the optimal relaying scheme.
Hence the destination essentially receives (Yr,i−1, YD,i) at the ith channel use and the eaves-
dropper receives Yr. The channel is therefore equivalent to a 1× 2 MIMO wiretap channel [4].
Note that the destination can remove the noise Ni completely by simply computing Yr,i + YD,i.
The eavesdropper, on the other hand, observes an AWGN link with finite capacity. Hence the
secrecy capacity of this channel is easily seen to be ∞.
Now, we construct a second relay channel. The channel is the same as the previous one except
that the received signal at the relay becomes:
{Yr, Xr} = {X +N,Xr} (197)
That is to say that the relay receives an additional copy of its transmitted signal. This should
not benefit the relay/eavesdropper at all. So the secrecy capacity is still ∞ .
Now, we construct a third relay channel from the second relay channel, by adding one more
eavesdropper to the model. Let the signal received by this second eavesdropper be:
Ye = {X −N,Xr} (198)
It follows that p(Ye|X,Xr) = p(X −N,Xr|X,Xr) = p(−N) = p(N) = p(Yr|X,Xr). Hence,
the new eavesdropper observes the same marginal distribution as the eavesdropper located at
the relay node. However, this eavesdropper receives exactly the same signal received by the
destination. Therefore the secrecy capacity of the new system is reduced to 0.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF THAT (45) AS A MARKOV CHAIN
Recall that A is shown in (1) as the local randomness generated at the relay. Using chain rule,
we have
p (Y nr , Y
n
e , X
n, Xnr , A)
= p (Xn, A)
n∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A, Y i−1e,1 , Xn
)
p
(
Ye,i, Yr,i|Y i−1e,1 , Y i−1r,1 , X ir,1, Xn, A
)
(199)
From (1), we observe that
Xr,i − {Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A} − {Y i−1e,1 , Xn} (200)
is a Markov chain. Since the channel is memoryless, and the relay function (1) has to be causal,
we observe
{Ye,i, Yr,i} − {Xr,i, Xi} − {Y i−1e,1 , Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , X]i[, A} (201)
is also a Markov chain. Applying these two Markov chains to (199), we have:
p (Y nr , Y
n
e , X
n, Xnr , A) = p (X
n, A)
n∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi) (202)
We next integrate out Y nr and Xnr from both side of (202). This can be done in a recursive
fashion as we show next. First we integrate over Yr,n on both side of (202). This gives us:
p
(
Y n−1r , Y
n
e , X
n, Xnr , A
)
=p (Xn, A)
n−1∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi)
p
(
Xr,n|Y n−1r,1 , Xn−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,n|Xr,n, Xn) (203)
From (43), we have p(Ye,n|Xr,n, Xn) = p(Ye,n|Xn). Applying it to (203) yields:
p
(
Y n−1r , Y
n
e , X
n, Xnr , A
)
=p (Xn, A)
n−1∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi)
p
(
Xr,n|Y n−1r,1 , Xn−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,n|Xn) (204)
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We next integrate over Xr,n on both side of (204), which yields:
p
(
Y n−1r,1 , Y
n
e , X
n, Xn−1r,1 , A
)
=p (Xn, A) p (Ye,n|Xn)
n−1∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi) (205)
Repeating the process in (203)-(205) for n− 1, n− 2, ..., 1, we have
p (Y ne , X
n, A) = p (Xn, A)
n∏
i=1
p (Ye,i|Xi) (206)
Integrating over A on both sides of (206), we have
p (Y ne , X
n) = p (Xn)
n∏
i=1
p (Ye,i|Xi) (207)
Integrating over Y ne,j+1 on both sides of (207), we have
p
(
Y je,1, X
n
)
= p (Xn)
j∏
i=1
p (Ye,i|Xi) (208)
Integrating over Ye,j on both sides of (208), we have
p
(
Y j−1e,1 , X
n
)
= p (Xn)
j−1∏
i=1
p (Ye,i|Xi) (209)
Dividing each side of (208) by the corresponding side of (209), we have
p
(
Ye,j|Y j−1e,1 , Xn
)
= p (Ye,j|Xj) (210)
Hence we have shown that Ye,j −Xj −X]j[Y j−1e,1 is a Markov chain.
We next prove that Yr,j −Xj −X]j[Y j−1r,1 is a Markov chain. Again, we start with (202) and
integrate out Y ne and Xnr from both side of it in a recursive fashion. First we integrate over Ye,n
on both side of (202) and obtain
p
(
Y nr , Y
n−1
e,1 , X
n, Xnr , A
)
=p (Xn, A)
n−1∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi)
p
(
Xr,n|Y n−1r,1 , Xn−1r,1 , A
)
p (Yr,n|Xr,n, Xn) (211)
Then from (43) we observe that p (Yr,n|Xr,n, Xn) = p (Yr,n|Xn). Hence (211) becomes:
p
(
Y nr , Y
n−1
e,1 , X
n, Xnr , A
)
=p (Xn, A)
n−1∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi)
p
(
Xr,n|Y n−1r,1 , Xn−1r,1 , A
)
p (Yr,n|Xn) (212)
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We next integrate over Xr,n on both side of (212), which yields:
p
(
Y nr , Y
n−1
e,1 , X
n, Xn−1r , A
)
=p (Xn, A) p (Yr,n|Xn)
n−1∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Ye,i, Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi) (213)
Repeating the process in (211)-(213) for n− 1, n− 2, ..., 1, we have
p (Y nr , X
n, A) = p (Xn, A)
n∏
i=1
p (Yr,i|Xi) (214)
Integrating over A on both sides of (214), we have
p (Y nr , X
n) = p (Xn)
n∏
i=1
p (Yr,i|Xi) (215)
Integrating over Y nr,j+1 on both sides of (215), we have
p
(
Y jr,1, X
n
)
= p (Xn)
j∏
i=1
p (Yr,i|Xi) (216)
Integrating over Yr,j on both sides of (216), we have
p
(
Y j−1r,1 , X
n
)
= p (Xn)
j−1∏
i=1
p (Yr,i|Xi) (217)
Dividing each side of (216) by the corresponding side of (217), we have
p
(
Yr,j|Y j−1r,1 , Xn
)
= p (Yr,j|Xj) (218)
Hence we have shown that Yr,j −Xj −X]j[Y j−1r,1 is a Markov chain.
APPENDIX F
PROOF THAT H(W |Y nr Xnr ) = H(W |Y nr ) FOR THE MODEL STATED IN (41)
We begin with
H(W |Y nr , Xnr ) = H(W |Y nr , Xnr , A) = H(W |Y nr , A) (219)
where the last equality follows from the fact that Xnr is a deterministic function of {Y nr , A}.
Hence we only need to prove H(W |Y nr , A) = H(W |Y nr ) for the channel model defined in (41).
This can be done as follows:
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First we factorize p (Y nr , Xn, Xnr , A,W ) using a similar procedure seen in (199)-(202):
p (Y nr , X
n, Xnr , A,W ) (220)
=p (W,A,Xn) p (Y nr , X
n
r |Xn, A,W ) (221)
=p (W,A,Xn)
n∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi) (222)
where in (222) we use the Markov chain stated in (200) and (201).
From (41), we have p (Yr,i|Xr,i, Xi) = p (Yr,i|Xi). Hence we have
p (Y nr , X
n, Xnr , A,W )
=p (W,A,Xn)
n∏
i=1
p
(
Xr,i|Y i−1r,1 , X i−1r,1 , A
)
p (Yr,i|Xi)
(223)
We next integrate out Xnr from both sides of (223) using the procedure shown in Appendix E,
which yields:
p (Y nr , X
n, A,W ) = p (W,Xn, A)
n∏
i=1
p (Yr,i|Xi) (224)
We next use the fact that Yr,i −Xi −X]i[Y i−1r,1 is a Markov chain, as stated in (45) and proved
in Appendix E, from which we have
p (Y nr , X
n, A,W ) = p (W,Xn, A)
n∏
i=1
p
(
Yr,i|Xn, Y i−1r,1
)
(225)
Since W is a deterministic function of Xn, we have
p (Y nr , X
n, A,W ) = p (W,Xn, A)
n∏
i=1
p
(
Yr,i|Xn, Y i−1r,1 ,W
)
(226)
= p (W,Xn, A) p (Y nr |Xn,W ) (227)
Since A is independent from W,Xn, (226)-(227) can be written as
p (Y nr , X
n, A,W ) = p (W,Xn, Y nr ) p (A) (228)
From it, we can write:
p (Y nr , A) = p (Y
n
r ) p (A) (229)
and
p (Y nr , A,W ) = p (W,Y
n
r ) p (A) (230)
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From (229) and (230), we have
p (W |Y nr , A) = p (W |Y nr ) (231)
Hence H(W |Y nr , A) = H(W |Y nr ).
APPENDIX G
PROOF THAT (79) IS AN UPPER BOUND
We begin with
H (W ) =H (W |Y ne ) + I (W ; Y ne ) (232)
Due to the secrecy constraint, we have limn→∞ 1nI(W ; Y
n
e ) = 0. Due to the fact that W can be
decoded from Y nD , Y nR reliably, we have, from Fano’s inequality, limn→∞ 1nH (W |Y nDY nR ) = 0.
Hence there exists ε > 0 such that
I (W ; Y ne ) < nε/2 (233)
H (W |Y nDY nR ) < nε/2 (234)
lim
n→∞ ε = 0 (235)
For this ε, we find (232) is upper bounded by
H (W |Y ne ) + nε/2 (236)
≤H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Y nDY nR ) + nε (237)
≤H (W |Y ne )−H (W |Y nDY nRXnr ) + nε (238)
≤I (W ; Y nD , Y nR , Xnr |Y ne ) + nε (239)
≤I (W,Xn; Y nD , Y nR , Xnr |Y ne ) + nε (240)
=I (Xn; Y nD , Y
n
R , X
n
r |Y ne ) + nε (241)
=I (Xn; Y nD , X
n
r |Y ne ) + I (Xn; Y nR |Y ne , Y nD , Xnr ) + nε (242)
=I (Xn; Y nD , X
n
r |Y ne ) +
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xn; YR,i|Y ne , Y nD , Xnr , Y i−1R,1
)
+ nε (243)
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From (55), we observe YR,i−{Y ne , Y nD , Xnr , Y i−1R,1 }−Xn is a Markov chain. Hence (243) equals:
I (Xn; Y nD , X
n
r |Y ne ) + nε (244)
≤I (Xn; Y nD , Y nr , Xnr |Y ne ) + nε (245)
=I (Xn; Y nD , Y
n
r |Y ne ) + I (Xn;Xnr |Y nD , Y nr , Y ne ) + nε (246)
=I (Xn; Y nD , Y
n
r |Y ne ) +
n∑
i=1
I
(
Xn;Xr,i|X i−1r,1 , Y nD , Y nr , Y ne
)
+ nε (247)
The term inside the sum in (247) can be bounded as
I
(
Xn;Xr,i|X i−1r,1 , Y nD , Y nr , Y ne
)
(248)
≤I
(
Xn;A,X ir,1|Y nD , Y nr , Y ne
)
(249)
≤I (Xn;A|Y nD , Y nr , Y ne ) + I
(
Xn;X ir,1|Y nD , Y nr , Y ne , A
)
(250)
=I (Xn;A|Y nD , Y nr , Y ne ) (251)
where A is the local randomness at the relay. (251) is due to the fact that X ir,1 is a deterministic
function of {Y nr , A}.
From (55), we have
p (Xn, Xnr , A, Y
n
D , Y
n
r , Y
n
e ) = p (X
n) p (A)
n∏
i=1
p (YD,i, Yr,i, Ye,i|Xi) p
(
Xr,i|X i−1r,1 , Y i−1r,1 , A
)
(252)
from which we have
p (Xn, Y nD , Y
n
r , Y
n
e , A) = p (X
n) p (A)
n∏
i=1
p (YD,i, Yr,i, Ye,i|Xi) (253)
Hence {Y nD , Y nr , Y ne , Xn} are all independent from A. Therefore (251) equals 0. (247) thus
becomes:
I (Xn; Y nD , Y
n
r |Y ne ) + nε (254)
=
n∑
i=1
h
(
YD,iYr,i|Y i−1D,1 Y i−1r,1 Y ne
)
−
n∑
i=1
h
(
YD,iYr,i|Y i−1D,1 Y i−1r,1 Y ne Xn
)
+ nε (255)
≤
n∑
i=1
h (YD,iYr,i|Ye,i)−
n∑
i=1
h
(
YD,iYr,i|Y i−1D,1 Y i−1r,1 Y ne Xn
)
+ nε (256)
From (55) and the fact that the channel is memoryless and the relay function is causal, we
observe that
{YD,i, Yr,i} − {Ye,i, Xi} − {Y i−1D,1 , Y i−1r,1 , Ye,]i[, X]i[} (257)
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is a Markov chain. Hence (256) equals:
n∑
i=1
h (YD,iYr,i|Ye,i)−
n∑
i=1
h (YD,iYr,i|Ye,iXi) + nε (258)
=
n∑
i=1
I (Xi; YD,iYr,i|Ye,i) + nε (259)
Define Q as a random variable that is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., n}. Define X =
XQ, YD = YD,Q, Yr = Yr,Q, Ye = Ye,Q. Then (259) equals:
nI (X ; YDYr|YeQ) + nε (260)
=n (h (YDYr|YeQ)− h (YDYr|YeXQ)) + nε (261)
≤n (h (YDYr|Ye)− h (YDYr|YeXQ)) + nε (262)
Since {YD, Yr} − {Ye, X} −Q is a Markov chain, (262) equals:
n (h (YDYr|Ye)− h (YDYr|YeX)) + nε (263)
=nI (X ; YDYr|Ye) + nε (264)
Dividing both sides by n and letting n→∞, we have the upper bound in (79).
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